The existence of significant wage differentials among "similar" individuals employed by different agencies in the federal government is explored. The theoretical framework proposes that the underlying reason for these differentials may be linked to the political influence exhibited by the constituencies and bureaucracies of federal agencies. The empirical results indicate that employees in federal agencies with small and well-organized constituencies and with bureaucracies that apparently share common interests generally receive higher wage rates. In fact, a small number of variables measuring these political factors explains about two-thirds of interagency wage differentials.
tribution of the government's resources to politically powerful interest groups (Peltzman 1976 (Peltzman , 1978 Becker 1978) . It is the working hypothesis of this paper that the federal bureaucracy can help or hinder the redistribution process, thus indirectly affecting the amount of political support from the public, as well as provide or withhold its own political support. In this framework, therefore, there are two important sets of factors which influence agency wage levels: (a) the characteristics of the agency's constituency, and (b) the characteristics of the agency's bureaucrats. The former set of factors would include both the size of the constituency and the degree of political organization of the interest group, while the latter set of factors would include variables measuring the degree to which the bureaucracy can control the flow of agency output and/or provide direct political support to the government.
Before proceeding to discuss these issues in detail, however, it is instructive to obtain an overall view of the wage structure in the federal government. Table 1 presents summary statistics on wages and turnover rates in selected federal agencies and in the federal government as a whole. There are several interesting empirical findings.
First, the average quit rate over the years 1961-76 shows a lot of variation across agencies.3 For example, some agencies like the Department of Transportation or the Postal Service have a quit rate of 0.5 or 0.6 percent. Other agencies, like the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Department of Agriculture, have quit rates nearly three times as high. These findings suggest that the wage the agency pays for a particular type of labor relative to the private sector wage for that type of labor varies significantly across agencies. 4 The fact that wages vary dramatically across agencies is also illustrated in table 1. It should be noted that these wage figures do not standardize for average skill differentials. However, note that some agencies improved the relative wage of their bureaucracies in the 1961-76 period more than others. For example, the Department of Justice barely changed the relative wage of its average employee during this period, while agencies like the Postal Service or the De-3 Although the separation rate was collected continuously by the Civil Service Commission, there was some experimentation in 1965-66 with the forms agencies used to report turnover statistics. As a result, the quit rate is not available for these years. Therefore, the average separation and quit rates reported in table 1 do not include the  1965-66 period. 'Admittedly, there are many other possible factors which might determine the level of turnover rates. However, unless costs of turnover and search vary widely among agencies, it is unlikely that these factors would explain the large turnover differentials reported in table 1. t These are relative wages, that is, the ratio of the agency wage to the private nonagricultural sector wage. The private sector wage rates in 1961 and 1976 were $2.14 and $4.87, respectively. The private sector wage rate is the average hourly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls. partment of Transportation substantially increased the relative wage of their workers. 5 These results suggest that agency differences in wage levels deserve further study. This paper provides a discussion of the economic reasons underlying agency wage differentials and presents empirical 5There exists a possibility that these differences may be due to disproportionate changes in the average skill levels of the agencies. Unfortunately, the Civil Service Commission did not collect information on educational attainment by agency until 1974.
evidence showing the persistence of these differentials after standardizing for interagency skill differences. Moreover, the results show that agency "political power" partly explains the differences suggested by table 1. Section II presents the theoretical framework for the study; Section III discusses the measurement of the agency's political influence; and Section IV presents the empirical analysis using a data set which contains a 1 percent random sample of the personnel records of federal workers. The empirical results concentrate on explaining wage differentials among individuals employed by the federal government. Finally, Section V summarizes the results of the study.
II. Framework
The theoretical framework for wage and employment decisions in the public sector has been analyzed by many economists.6 Perhaps the simplest approach is to suppose that there is a single government goal: the maximization of political support.7 The government accomplishes this objective by redistributing its resources optimally among competing groups. This income redistribution is obtained by an allocation of the government budget among its various agencies or functions. Each agency, in turn, uses its resources to produce an output which is distributed to the agency's constituency.
Assume there are k "agencies" in the government.8 Each of these agencies produces an output, Zi, which is distributed to the public free of charge. Individual in the population has a "vote" function, V1. This function can be thought of as giving the probability that he will support the incumbent government and is defined over the output of federal agencies and a vector of "environmental" characteristics, x, which may affect his voting behavior. Thus, V3 = VJ(Z1, . .., Zk; x).
()
The vector x may include variables measuring the strength of his convictions on any particular government program, the degree of organization of interest groups, the size of the interest groups, etc. . ., Zk; X), (2) j=1 where N is the number of voting individuals in the population. The government faces two constraints. The first is that Zi must be produced by the agency. Assume that Zi is produced using a fixed capital stock, the agency's labor force, and the bureaucrats' cooperation or effort. The fundamental assumption of the analysis, therefore, is that the treatment of bureaucrats by the government affects agency output: Bureaucrats will hinder the flow of agency output when their wage is low and will increase the flow when the wage is high. Thus the production function for agency i is given by Zi = Zi(wi,Li; ai),
where wi is the agency wage (Zi > 0); Li is the agency's labor force (Zt > 0); and ai is an environmental vector of variables capturing the degree of organization of the agency's bureaucracy, etc. It is assumed that the production functions in (3) are concave and that wi is not an inferior input in the production of Z2.
The second constraint faced by the government is that its revenues equal its expenditures.9 In this simple model, the size of the government budget is taken as exogenous although it, too, is chosen so as to maximize political support.10 Letting T be the government's revenue (and ignoring the fixed costs): 
V)zzi -xwi = 0 9 A discussion of how the government chooses the optimal level of public debt is contained in Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1979 . 10 This is formally equivalent to the firm choosing optimal inputs for given levels of output and then choosing the optimal output so as to maximize profits. For an analysis of optimal levels of government expenditures, see Peltzman (1978) .
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where Viz = OVj3IZi and X is the marginal vote gain obtained from an increase in total government expenditures.
It should be noted that the equalities in (5) are a result of the implicit assumption that the government can hire its desired labor force at the wages given by the solution to (5). Obviously, there are supply constraints on the government's behavior. It may be that the optimal government wage lies below the competitive wage so that the labor force the government wishes to hire is unavailable at the wage it is paying. To focus the problem on the effects of political variables on the wage structure these supply constraints are not introduced in the model, but their role in the empirical work will be discussed in Section IV.
In order to introduce the size of the agency's constituency directly into the first-order conditions it is useful to make two additional assumptions specifying how vote functions differ across individuals. First, it is important to note that agency output is not distributed equally across the population for a variety of reasons. These reasons could be geographic since, for example, the average person in California receives little direct benefit from expenditures in the Ozarks Regional Commission. Moreover, certain government programs are designed to benefit certain target groups. I make the assumption that if a given person does not benefit from expenditures in a given agency then (small) changes in that agency's output do not affect his political support. That is, W = 0 for all individuals who view the ith agency as producing an output which is not meant to benefit them. This will hold true for the set of individuals who are not constituents of the agency. Thus the constituency of the agency is formed by individuals who view the agency's output as beneficial to their utility. I further assume that all constituents are identical in that they have the same vote function and share equally in agency output. Then the marginal vote gain from increases in the output of agency i is the same for all individuals who obtain benefits from that agency; thus Viz = Vi for all] who are constituents of the agency. Given these simplifying assumptions, the summations in (5) are carried out only over the agency's constituency: 11 A more general model would, of course, incorporate the fact that the size of the beneficiaries is itself an endogenous variable. For an analysis of the factors determining the optimal size of the constituency, see Peltzman (1976) . It should be noted that the analysis concentrates on the role of constituents, defined as the beneficiaries of agency output, while ignoring the role of "opponents," the group of individuals whose political support to the government is negatively related to the production of agency output. 
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The ratio of marginal products equals the ratio of marginal costs in equilibrium. Therefore, each agency's output is produced at the cost-minimizing position. Figure 1 represents such an equilibrium position at point e1.
The difficulty with obtaining unambiguous comparative-statics predictions in this type of model is well known. This difficulty arises because wi and Li enter multiplicatively in the budget constraint. To illustrate the problem, consider what happens when the government budget is increased exogenously. As long as Zi is a normal input in the public's vote functions, the budget allocation to the ith agency increases as illustrated in figure 1. Suppose further that production is "biased" toward Li; that is, changes in the agency's revenues lead to larger percentage changes in Li than in wi. The increase in the agency's budget tends to increase-as a first-order effect-the demand for both wi and Li. If the shadow prices of wages and labor could be held constant that movement would correspond to the shift from e, to e2. This change would represent a "pure" income effect -that is, the expansion of wi and Li due to an increase in T, holding relative marginal costs constant. However, because production is assumed to be biased toward Li the relative price of the wage input in the production function increases. This induces a substitution effect from wages to labor represented by the shift from e2 to e3. Thus it could be that the observed income effect (the move from e, to e3) indicates that wages are "inferior," when in fact the true income effect (the move from e, to e2) indicates that wages increase as T increases. 
since the vote gain from increasing output is lower if that output must be distributed over a larger constituency. In other words, since the individual's share of a given increase in agency output diminishes the larger the number of beneficiaries, the additional political support by the individual from a given increase in agency output is smaller the larger the constituency. Second, even if ZP is a pure public good we would expect (7) (9) where 0 is the minor that remains from the Hessian determinant A when the two rows and columns referring to the ith agency are deleted. Note that the second-order conditions ensure that ? and A are both positive.
Equation (9) reflects the fact that an agency's budget increases when a larger constituency leads to a larger number of votes and decreases when a larger constituency leads to a smaller number of votes since the term VI + nVi n indicates how a change in the number of constituents affects the number of votes.15 Assume for concreteness that VI + nViZn > 0. The first term in equation (8) reflects the income effect of this increase in the agency's budget on wi and is nonnegative as long as the wage is not an inferior input. The second term, however, is negative and measures the resulting price effect due to a change in relative marginal costs. Note that, since (9) is positive, the theory predicts that perhaps wi or Li declines as ni increases, but that both cannot decline simultaneously.
More insight into the relative importance of these effects can be obtained by considering the following conceptual experiment: What happens to wi and Li if ni increases and we hold constant the marginal costs of these variables at the initial levels of the shadow prices? '6 14 That is, for a representative individual, V = 1 V1(Z1,XU). This assumption clearly leads to problems if we interpret V as a probability of support measure, but it greatly simplifies the derivation of the comparative-statics results. 15 The term Vi + niVi n can be rewritten as Vi( 1 + )), where i) = d In ViId In ni. Thus votes increase (decrease) if the response in the marginal vote gain is inelastic (elastic). 16 The relevant income concept for this experiment would be T* = E=i (w=pw. + LipLi), where pwi = Li and is the marginal cost of raising the wage andpLi = wi and is the marginal cost of hiring labor. In the experiment described in the text pwi and pLi are held constant. where * indicates that these are true effects, as compared with the price-contaminated expansion effect in (8) . The determinants 0* and A* follow the same definitions as in the earlier maximization problem. Equation (10) reveals that the true change in wi (holding shadow prices constant) will be nonnegative as long as Vi + niVl is positive and wi is not an inferior input. In fact, the relationship between the true and the observed expansion effects is summarized by17 Therefore, the observed elasticity of wages with respect to number of constituents (Ewi) depends positively on the true elasticity (E*i) and negatively on the true elasticity of Li with respect to ni (E*i). If Vi + ni2V, is positive we may obtain the result that larger groups provide fewer votes when, in fact, the opposite is true. In fact, a necessary condition for Ewi to be negative (if the true elasticity is positive) is that E* < E*i; that is, production of agency output is biased toward labor.
B. The Organization of the Constituency
Clearly two agencies with the same number of constituents may still receive different treatment because, for a variety of reasons, one group of constituents "matters" more than the other group. That is, the favored agency has a group of constituents who can provide a larger amount of political support. Thus the vote function should be expanded to include another environmental variable, si, measuring the political savvy of the constituency of the ith agency. Define si such that higher values of si indicate a larger amount of political cohesiveness by the constituency. Clearly a more general framework would incorporate the fact that the weight of the constituency is likely to be the result of another optimizing process, namely, the amount the constituency invests in influencing policy. Obviously, this will depend on the benefits and costs of the investment. This insight will be helpful below in obtaining empirical proxies for si. The basic hypothesis is that
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Thus a more organized constituency (larger si) can provide a larger number of votes for any given increase in ZP. Government expenditures in agencies with better constituency organization will be larger since a larger number of effective votes can be obtained. This expansion of the agency budget will affect the agency's wage level. As before, the observed wage effect depends on the true values of the elasticities of wages and labor with respect to si:
where the g's are the respective elasticities. As si rises, the expansion in the agency budget will create an incentive to increase agency wages. However, the corresponding rise in Li will change the marginal cost of raising the agency wage rate. Thus if production is biased toward Li we may observe that there exists a negative relationship between wi and si, when the true effect is positive.
C. The Organization of the Bureaucracy
The driving force underlying the results in this section has been the maintained assumption that bureaucrats can control the flow of agency output. It should be clear that well-organized bureaucrats can control this flow better than disorganized bureaucrats. The degree of organization may be observed, as in a union, or be implicit in the organizational structure of the agency. In the production functions given by (3), ai acts as the environmental variable indicating the extent of bureaucratic control over agency output. In order to derive the sign of dw/*ldci (clearly the observed effect includes the price change induced by the corresponding shift in Li), the nature of the dependence between the technology and ai must be specified exactly.
The most immediate consideration is to describe how ai affects the slope of the agency's isoquant. Clearly, as long as larger ai gives bureaucrats a tighter grasp of control over agency output, we might expect the well-organized agencies to respond much more sensitively to changes in the agency wage. Thus:
An extreme form of this argument, used in the comparative-statics because of its simplicity, is that Zi > 0 and ZL = 0. Thus, for any level of agency budget an increase in ai leads to a change in equilibrium from e1 to e2 as shown in figure 2 . The second effect we must consider is how better organization of bureaucrats affects the level of agency output for given wi and Li. goal of bureaucratic power would be to improve their economic conditions and to use that power in ways that will further this objective. Thus it would be odd to find a strong "union" of bureaucrats in a firm paying wi wages and hiring Li individuals to be producing more output than a weaker union of bureaucrats in a similar size firm. These considerations suggest that Z' < 0. If these assumptions concerning the effect of bureaucratic power on the agency's production technology are correct it is easy to show that dwi* > 0.
dai Essentially there are two effects taking place. On the one hand, the relative increase in the marginal product of wi over Li makes a shift toward a wage-intensive production technique profitable. Moreover, since Zi is negative, to obtain the desired level of Zi more resources are transferred to that agency, causing the expansion effects that we have seen earlier.
III. Data
The data set that will be analyzed in this paper is a 1 percent random sample from the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) compiled by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. The CPDF analyzed in this paper contains data for civilian federal workers employed as of July 1977. These workers were classified as permanent, full-time civil servants working within the United States. Note that by restricting the sample to these workers, and since annual earnings in the data refer to the individual's full-time salary, annual earnings are strictly proportional to the wage rate. The theoretical model discussed in the previous section suggests three important variables that are likely to affect bureaucratic wages and create interagency wage differentials: the number of constituents, the degree of constituent organization, and the degree of bureaucratic organization. Obviously, none of these concepts is well defined empirically, and hence proxies must be created.
A. The Number of Constituents
This variable has no close empirical counterpart since no enumeration exists of the number of people directly benefiting from expenditures in a given agency. There are, however, two approaches that can be used to derive where elk gives the share of the budget of a representative agency going to individuals in state k and Nk is the population in state k. Note that to simplify notation the agency subscript is omitted.
As is well known, the upper limit forH is unity, occurring when one individual obtains the total budget. If all individuals in the country share equally, it is easy to show that H = 1/N, where N = EkNk. To simplify and to allow the utilization of existing data, suppose that all 18 A detailed discussion of the benefits and problems associated with Herfindahl indexes is contained in Stigler (1968 
which gives the proportion of the population that receives "direct" benefits from expenditures in the agency. Clearly (18) Thus it gives the fraction of the country's population who benefit "significantly" from the agency's output. Since the Washington, D.C., area is a district where Nkek > Nk/N for almost all agencies, its population is deleted from the summation in the numerator of (19).
A second method of obtaining proxies for ni involves identification of interest groups for particular agencies. There is a tradition in industrial organization claiming that (at least) regulatory agencies are "captured" by or created for the benefit of the industries they are supposed to regulate.20 Thus it may be possible to assume, at least as a first-order approximation, that the Civil Aeronautics Board's constituency is formed by the number of employees in the transportation- 19 It should be noted that in constructing the variables discussed in this section all small agencies (i.e., agencies with fewer than 500 employees) were combined into a single group. This affected about 4 percent of the sample. 20 A detailed discussion of these hypotheses can be found in Stigler (1971) .
by-air industry; the Interstate Commerce Commission's constituents are employed in the trucking, warehousing, and railroad transportation industries; the Agriculture Department's constituents are the employees in the agricultural industry, etc. Appendix A describes in detail the interest groups associated with each major federal agency. Admittedly, there is a certain element of arbitrariness in matching interest groups with agencies. However, in many cases the classification was easy and clearly followed from the description of agency responsibilities found in the United States Government Manual (U.S. General Services Administration 1978). The "industry-based" constituency variable CONINDI is defined as the fraction of the civilian labor force employed in industries associated with the federal agency. For some major agencies-especially the Defense Department, the Postal Service, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)-no natural constituencies could be found. Hence CONINDI was simply set equal to CONPOPI for these agencies. That is, for agencies where the constituency was hard to identify I simply resorted to the population-based measure CONPOP1. Alternatively, I could resort to the second population-based measure leading to the creation of CONIND2.
It should be obvious that these constituency variables are likely to have large measurement error. If so, then the effects of these variables on agency earnings will reflect a lot of noise and will tend toward zero. As will be seen below, however, there is a remarkable consistency in the effects of each of the four constituency variables on agency wage rates.
B. The Organization of Constituents
The theory presented above suggests that not only is the number of constituents important, but that their political organization also matters. Again this variable is unobserved but clearly depends on the costs and benefits of organizing in order to influence agency policy. One aspect of costs of organization is the geographic dispersion of the constituency, since presumably the more widely dispersed the beneficiaries the more costly it would be to have a cohesive constituency. Fortunately, by using the same data used to construct CON-POP1, it is possible to get a measure of the geographic dispersion of the constituency. In particular, define fl* The variable used to measure the benefits of constituency organization is the proportion of the agency's budget spent in the form of direct grants to localities and individuals. Presumably, the benefits to organization are greater if the money is received directly from the government and is not spent on overhead and other transaction costs. This variable is denoted by GRANT.21
C. The Degree of Bureaucratic Organization
We seek an empirical variable that measures whether a group of bureaucrats can easily translate a low agency wage into disruption of agency output and a high agency wage into cooperation with agency management. The empirical hypothesis used in this paper is that groups of bureaucrats which are homogeneous in relevant characteristics should have an easier time in "organizing" themselves so as to make their response to wage changes known. In other words, in agencies where labor is of varying skills, at different stages in government careers, and more geographically dispersed, there are likely to be fewer common interests, raising the costs of organization by the bureaucracy and hence lowering the agency wage. Therefore, variables measuring inequality in relevant characteristics of the bureaucrats within the agency should have negative effects on wage levels.
It could be argued that agency homogeneity is not a relevant measure of bureaucratic power since senior bureaucrats in a relatively homogeneous agency might take over the agency and exploit junior bureaucrats if the latter are easy to replace. Undoubtedly some of this may occur, but presumably rewards to senior bureaucrats depend on the agency's output. Clearly the incentive of junior bureaucrats to produce output and thus contribute to the power of senior bureau-WAGF DFTFRMTNATION 1 1 9'7 crats will be greater the higher their wage. Hence there is an incentive for senior bureaucrats to "share" the rewards of increased output with the agency's labor force, though the distribution of the rewards may be highly skewed. The empirical work below uses three measures of inequality in bureaucratic characteristics: the standard deviation of educational attainment within the agency, o-(EDUC); the standard deviation of age in the agency, o-(AGE); and the standard deviation of job tenure within the agency, o-(JOB). Each of these variables is constructed from the CPDF.
An alternative measure of agency homogeneity is given by the number of bureaus organized within the agency (NUM). Although most agencies contain only one bureau, superagencies like the Department of Defense contain over seventy, and a moderately sized Department of Justice contains eight administrative bureaus. One can argue that such diversity in agency output is likely to fragment the common interests of the agency's bureaucracy, since bureaucrats within the agency will have to compete among themselves for a share of the agency's money. Thus the model outlined earlier would predict that agencies with many bureaus would have relatively lower wages.22 Table 2 presents estimated values of the variables discussed in this section for selected agencies. As expected, agencies like HEW, the Postal Service, and the Veterans Administration (VA) serve the largest number of constituents in a considerable number of equivalent political units. By contrast, regulatory agencies tend to have small constituencies since their funds are mostly spent in the District of Columbia or they regulate industries which form only a small proportion of the nation's labor force. Since this may create a potential measurement-error problem, the results in the next section will be estimated in different samples to ascertain the sensitivity of the estimated effects to measurement errors.
IV. The Wage Structure
The data analyzed in this section are a sample of 21,681 federal civilian personnel records from the CPDF.23 These observations were selected from the random 1 percent sample on the basis of their 22 There are some problems associated with the variable NUM. It may reflect not only the diversity of the agency, but also its size. Although the correlation between NUM and the agency's budget is not perfect, it is quite high (0.85). Due to this potential problem, the earnings functions below are sometimes estimated omitting NUM. 23 It should be noted that some agencies are not represented in the CPDF. These include intelligence agencies and employees in the legislative branch of the government. The only sizable independent agency omitted from the CPDF is the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
where yj is a vector of standardizing socioeconomic variables for individual j.24 Table 3 the variance in earnings across individuals and across agencies. After the inclusion of the agency dummies, R2 increases to 66 percent. The F-statistic associated with this increase in R2 is 42.9, highly significant at all conventional confidence levels. The theoretical framework presented earlier suggested several factors which may be partly responsible for the observed wage differentials across agencies. Table 5 adds variables measuring these political factors to the pooled earnings function presented in table 3 using the detailed education vector. Columns 1-4 present the coefficients of these variables for all four alternative constituency variables and using the standard deviation variables (instead of NUM, the number of bureaus) to control for the cohesiveness of bureaucrats.
Note the very strong negative effect of the number of constituents, regardless of the way it is measured, on wage rates. The qualitative consistency in this finding is striking considering the derivation of these variables and the fact that the correlation among these variables is not excessive.28 Given this evidence, one must conclude that the observed effect of the size of constituents on agency wages is negative. Recall, however, that even though raising the size of the constituency may lead to a larger wage rate it also leads to a larger labor force. Since the size of the labor force is the price of raising the wage rate, the observed relationship is contaminated by a negative price effect. We will see below that controlling for the size of the agency's labor force generally leads to nonnegative effects of ni on wi.
Note also that the variables measuring the cohesiveness of the constituency (STATE 1 or STATE2, and GRANT) behave as expected. The larger the geographic dispersion of the beneficiaries, the lower agency wage rates. Similarly, the greater the benefits to be gained from organizing (the larger GRANT), the higher agency wage rates. Thus, as predicted by the model, bureaucratic wages respond to investments made by the constituency in influencing the distribution of agency output. higher wages to homogeneous groups of workers. Unfortunately, little evidence exists either supporting or refuting the hypothesis in the private sector.29 To the extent that homogeneity among bureaucrats measures common interests and, therefore, lower costs of organizing, the results indicate that more cohesive bureaucratic groups fare better in the federal government. At this point it is worthwhile to conduct two empirical experiments designed to determine the robustness of the results concerning the standard deviation variables. First, it could be argued that the homogeneity variables are capturing some kinds of nonlinearities in EDUC, JOB, and AGE. In fact, the regressions allow for nonlinearities in all these variables. Moreover, when I estimated the regression in column 1 of table 5 A second potential problem with the standard deviation variables is that they may be proxying for factors other than the homogeneity hypothesis outlined earlier. For example, it is possible that the a's are smaller in very large agencies (such as Defense, HEW, or the Postal Service) which have large clerical labor forces, or groups of relatively similar individuals doing identical jobs (e.g., mail carriers). Thus the strong negative effect of the homogeneity variables may be due to the fact that homogeneous agencies have larger labor forces and that larger groups of bureaucrats have more political clout and hence receive higher wages.30 The simplest way to test this hypothesis is to replace the standard deviation variables by Li, the size of the agency's labor force (measured in thousands). This experiment is shown in column 5 using CONIND 1 as the size of the constituency variable. As can be seen, the coefficient of Li is strongly negative, refuting the hypothesis that the standard deviation variables are proxying for the political clout of larger groups of bureaucrats.3' Moreover R2 drops 29 It would seem that a simple way of testing the hypothesis in the private sector would be by comparing the wage effects of craft versus industrial unions. The empirical evidence on this is not unanimous (see, e.g., Lewis 1963 and Leigh 1978) . 000. Clearly since Li and wi depend, in general, on the same set of variables there are difficult problems involved in identifying the stochastic equivalent of equation (23').36 The easiest approach to identification in this context is to recall that there are supply constraints that were not introduced in the model. In particular, the government faces a structural supply function giving the amount of labor it can hire at the wage it is willing to pay for given skill and other socioeconomic characteristics. Thus the governmental agency may not be able to hire the amount of labor it desires and will end up in corner solutions in terms of the model in Section II. The important point is that there exist shift variables affecting the supply of workers which do not directly determine the agency's wage. The predicted value of Li was estimated from a regression using the agency as the unit of observa- tion where the various exogenous variables of the model and supply shift factors were included as independent variables.37 Table 7 presents coefficients from regresssions where the predicted size of the labor force (measured in thousands), Li, is held constant. These coefficients are interpreted as the true effects of the variables since the marginal cost of increasing the wage is being held constant. As in table 5, columns 1-4 present the coefficients using the alterna37The independent variables included DC, average age, tenure, and education of workers in the agency; percent black or female; percent blue-collar positions; o(EDUC); u(AGE); N(JOB); size of the constituency; geographic dispersion of the constituency; and GRANT. tive measures for the size of constituency and the standard deviation variables as proxies for bureaucratic heterogeneity.
As can be seen, the coefficient of Li is negative and significant, confirming the view that the agency's labor force is the price of the wage input in the production function. The true coefficient of the size of the constituency is worth noting. It was shown earlier that as long as the increase in constituency led to more votes, we would expect to find higher wages and employment. If this expansion effect was significantly biased in favor of employment, the relative cost of raising wages would rise, and hence an induced substitution effect would occur and perhaps result in an observed effect being negative when the true effect was, in fact, positive. The introduction of Li to control for this price effect systematically reduces (in absolute value) the effect of size of constituency on wages as expected. In one case, the size of constituency has a strong positive effect on agency wage rate, while, with the remaining measures, even though the effect is still negative it is often insignificant. Thus the results suggest that the true effect of ni may be nonnegative.
V. Summary
This paper has attempted to provide an economic analysis of the internal structure of wages in the federal government. The underlying hypothesis of the study is that the wage paid to federal bureaucrats reflects not only labor market conditions but political factors as well. In particular, because bureaucrats can control the flow of agency output-thus affecting the public image of the government and political support for the incumbents-the government will rationally choose a wage-employment package which depends on the various factors that determine the extent of political support.
The major empirical result of the analysis is the finding of significant wage differentials among federal agencies. More important, it was seen that these wage differentials could be explained by resorting to variables measuring agency political power. In particular, employees in agencies with small and well-organized constituencies, and with bureaucracies that apparently share common interests, generally receive higher wage rates. These facts were interpreted in terms of a political model in which the government chooses the optimal wage-employment combination that will maximize the vote effectiveness of agency output. It should be noted that an easy criticism of this interpretation would be to claim that the analysis ignores the institutional framework used by each agency's personnel department. The problem with this view is that institutions are not created out of thin air. Rather, institutions are developed to simplify the mechanism through which optimal allocation of resources is made in any organization. Thus, an alternative interpretation of the results could be that the behavior of the institutions developed by federal agencies to hire, place, and promote bureaucrats is consistent with the vote-maximization hypothesis.
The analysis suggests several areas where further research into government wage policy would be useful. First, a more complete analysis would undertake the empirical study of a multiequation dynamic model incorporating the wage, employment, and budgetary decisions of the government. Second, testing of alternative hypotheses of government behavior should be conducted more systematically. The literature is full of models purporting to describe government behavior. Some of these models even lead to empirically testable implications. A systematic analysis attempting to discriminate among these models would provide further insight into the underlying processes. Third, the wage differentials documented in this paper must lead to some job rationing among applicants. A careful study of applications for civil service jobs would be useful in further documenting the civil service wage structure. Fourth, the problem of congressional oversight over budgets of federal agencies is quite complex, and case studies describing the process for major agencies may lead to some understanding of the controls on bureaucratic behavior. Fifth, although this paper has focused on the agency as the natural unit of analysis, wage differentials among bureaus within an agency could presumably be explained by the same framework. 
